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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a contract in which Respondent loaned $500,000 to
Appellant's limited liability company. Appellant agreed to repay the loan for Appellant's
limited liability company. Appellant never paid any principal or interest on the loan.
When Respondent sued Appellant on the loan, Appellant filed a counterclaim alleging
various claims and attempting to justify Appellant's lack of performance. Ultimately, the
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Respondent awarding Respondent
the $500,000 Respondent loaned Appellant plus prejudgment interest.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of a contract dated March 14, 2013 (the "Agreement"). 1 The
parties to the Agreement are the Appellant, Helmut Robert Tacke ("Tacke"}, the
Respondent, The Christopher W. James Trust, UDT February 7, 1979 (the "Trust"}, and
Firstfruits Foundation ("Firstfruits"). 2 The Agreement concerned 374 acres located in
Lemhi County, Idaho. 3 This real property was owned by Tacke, who also owned and
operated Idaho Mineral Springs, LLC ("IMS"}, a Nevada limited liability company. 4 The
Nevada Secretary of State's Office currently states that IMS's status as an LLC is "revoked"
and that termination is perpetual. 5 The Agreement has two substantive components: (1)
Firstfruits' purchase of 364 acres from Tacke; and (2) a loan by the Trust to IMS.6

1

R. at pp. 37-39.
R. at pp. 37-39.
1
R. at pp. 37-39.
4
R. at pp. 37-39.
5
The status of IMS in Nevada is not in the District Court's record, but it is a fact of which this Court can
properly take judicial notice. A copy of the Nevada Secretary of State's IMS Entity Information is attached
hereto as Appendix 'A'.
6
R. at pp. 37-39.
1
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With regards to the purchase of the real property by Firstfruits, Tacke owed
approximately $756,000.00 on first and second mortgages filed against the 374 acres.7
Firstfruits paid off the mortgages in exchange for 364 of the 374 acres. 8 Throughout
Appellant's Brief, Tacke alludes to conflicts between Tacke and Firstfruits regarding
violation of water rights and damage to a waterline; however, these matters are not
before the Court on appeal, and Firstfruits is not a party to this action. Tacke attempted
to distract the District Court in a similar fashion, but the District Court found that "the
record identifies the individual who likely diverted water but the record also establishes
that the individual did not do so as an employee or agent of [the Trust]. There is no basis
to conclude that [the Trust] was responsible for any wrongful diversion or interference."9
This Court should not be distracted by Tacke's inclusion of these issues, which Tacke
acknowledges is part of a separate complaint.10
At issue in the present appeal is the second portion of the Agreement, in which
the Trust agreed to loan, and did loan, $500,000.00 to IMS for two years at 5% interest. 11
Tacke's attempts to reclassify this $500,000 as an investment are contrary to the express
language of the Agreement, which states that ''The Trust will lend U.S. $500,000 to IMS
for two years ...." 12 In lieu of payment in U.S. currency, the Agreement called for specific
performance in gold, silver and Australian dollars. Id. The contract specified that "[i]f IMS
does not repay the loan no later than March 15, 2015, then the loan will remain standing

7

R. at pp. 37-39.
R. at pp. 37-39.
9
R. at p. 217.
10
See Appellant's Brief, Footnote 4, p. 10.
11 R. at pp. 37-39.
12
R. at pp. 37-39. (Emphasis added).
8
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as a debt, and IMS will transfer to the Trust 20% ownership in IMS on March 15, 2015 and
20% ownership on March 15, 2017." 13 In other words, if Tacke failed to make repayment
as required, Tacke still owed the debt and would be required to transfer 40% ownership
of IMS to the Trust as a penalty. If Tacke repaid the loan in full prior to March 15, 2015,
the Trust would receive no equity in IMS.
Tacke never made any payment whatsoever on the loan - either interest or
principal - and never transferred any ownership interest to the Trust. Accordingly, the
Trust filed suit to recover damages against Tacke for failure to repay the loan. Tacke does
not dispute that the loan was received, that the loan was not repaid and that no interest
in IMS was transferred to the Trust, but alleges that the District Court should have
awarded specific performance in gold, silver and Australia dollars, or compel the Trust to
accept an interest in an unfunded entity that no longer exists, rather than award
damages.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On May 16, 2018, the District Court granted the Trust Partial Summary Judgment
against Tacke for breach of contract for failure to repay the loan.14 By his own admission,
Tacke, did "nothing in response [to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] and
instead [counsel] appeared at the hearing to ask for more time to do discovery- a request
the District Court denied."15 Contrary to Tacke's assertion in his Brief, he did not file a
Rule 56(d) Motion to Delay but filed only a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Request

13

R. at pp. 37-39. (Emphasis added).
R. at p. 95.
15 See Appellant's Brief, p. 10.
14
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for Discovery in Response to Rule 56 Motion after the Court had already ruled on the
Motion.16
On July 19, 2018, The Trust filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment as to all
of Tacke's counterclaims. 17 Again, Tacke admits that he did not respond or otherwise
oppose this Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 18 On August 21, 2018, the District
Court entered Summary Judgment in The Trust's favor and then entered Judgment for
$500,000, with post-judgment interest accruing at the statutory rate. 19 The District Court
failed to calculate and include the prejudgment interest which was granted in the May
16, 2018 Order.20
On August 29, 2018, Tacke filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the August 21,
2018SummaryJudgment. 21 On November 7, 2018 in support of his Motion, (one day prior
to the hearing), Tacke submitted an Affidavit and deposition transcripts.

22

These

documents were submitted pro se as Tacke's attorney had withdrawn by Order of the
Court.23 The Affidavit was subscribed and sworn in front of Jana Eagle; however no seal
was affixed to the Affidavit. 24 On November 8, 2018, a hearing was held on Tacke's
Motion for Reconsideration.25 In spite of Tacke's late filing of the Affidavit, the District
Court considered the Affidavit and denied Tacke's Motion for Reconsideration, having

16

R. at pp. 97-99.
R. at pp. 145-46.
18
See Appellant's Brief, p. 11.
19
R. at pp. 152-53.
20
R. at pp. 154-55.
21 R. at pp. 158-60.
22
R. at pp. 212-15.
23
R. at pp. 208-09.
24 R. at p. 213.
25
R. at p. 9.
17
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"found the contract to be clear and unambiguous, and as such, prior discussions as set
out in depositions cannot alter the terms ofthe contract."26 Contrary to Tacke's assertion,
Tacke did not file a pro se Second Motion for Reconsideration in November, 2018, and
Tacke's reliance upon a non-existent Motion for Reconsideration serves only to confuse
the Court on the procedural timeline. 27
On August 28, 2018, the Trust filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs28 and a
Motion for Prejudgment Interest. 29 Because the District Court had already granted
prejudgment interest in favor of the Trust,30 the Motion for Prejudgment Interest was not
a substantive motion but a Rule 60(a) Motion to incorporate the District Court's prior
interest decision into an Amended Judgment. The Court did not enter an Order on the
Trust's Motions until January 23, 2019. 31 Relying upon the Court's May 15, 2018
Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court entered its Order incorporating the
prejudgment interest into an Amended Judgment. 32 At no time did Tacke provide any
opposition to the Trust's Motions for Costs, Fees and Prejudgment Interest, a fact
specifically identified by the District Court in its Order.33
On February 7, 2019, Tacke filed another Motion for Reconsideration. 34 On
February 12, 2019, the District Court entered an Order denying reconsideration of all

26

R. at p. 217.
The Trust recognizes that there will now be confusion regarding how to designate the Motion for
Reconsideration filed on February 7, 2019. To limit such confusion, the Trust will refer to the Motions for
Reconsideration by the date filed .
28
R. at pp. 197-99.
29
R. at pp. 200-01.
30
R. at pp. 93-96.
31
R. at pp. 221-23.
32
R. at pp. 221-23.
33
R. at p. 355.
34
R. at pp. 226-28.
27

9

issues, except for the District Court's Order on prejudgment interest, attorney's fees and
costs.35 The District Court correctly found that entry of the Amended Judgment did not
extend the time in which to file a Motion for Reconsideration as to the original
Judgment. 36 On March 26, 2019, the District Court entered an Order denying Tacke's
Motion to Reconsider prejudgment interest, attorney's fees and costs for failure to
provide any objection on these issues.37 Tacke filed his Notice of Appeal on May 6, 2019.38

35

R. at pp. 295-97.
R. at pp. 295-97.
37
R. at p. 355.
38
R. at pp. 358-63.
36
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

a.

Whether Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho
Code Sections 12-107, 12-120, and 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLATE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AS TO ALL ISSUES EXCEPTING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
A post-judgment motion for prejudgment interest is of necessity either a substantive

motion or non-substantive motion (the District Court used the term "derivative" in its
Order).39 Motions which substantively seek to alter or amend a judgment are brought under
IRCP 59(e). Motions which merely seek non-substantive relief from a judgment are brought
under Rule 60(a) or 60{b)(l). Tacke argues that the motion for prejudgment interest was a
substantive motion which modified the appeal deadlines under IAR 14 until an order was
entered on the motion. Whether the Trust's Motion for Prejudgment Interest was a
substantive motion under IRCP 59(e) or a non-substantive motion under Rule 60, the
outcome is the same. Tacke failed to comply with the time limits under IAR 14, and this Court
is without jurisdiction to hear his appeal as to all issues, except the District Court's award of
the Trust's attorney's fees and costs.

A.

If The Motion For Prejudgment Interest Is A Non-Substantive Motion Under
Rule 60. Then The Judgment Entered August 21, 2018 Was A Final Judgment
And The Time For Filing An Appeal Expired On January 8. 2019.

Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires that appeals from a District Court be filed within
42 days from the date of filing of any appealable judgment or order. Appellate jurisdiction
vests only if a notice of appeal is filed within 42 days of the entry of the particular judgment
sought to be challenged. Zieman v. Creed, 121 Idaho 259, 260, 824 P.2d 190 (1992). In the
present action, Judgment was entered on August 21, 2018.40 Due to the filing of a timely

39
40

R. at p. 355
R. at pp. 154-55.
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Motion for Reconsideration on August 29, 2018, the time for filing an appeal of the August
21, 2018 Judgment commenced upon entry of an Order deciding the Motion for
Reconsideration. The District Court denied Tacke's Motion for Reconsideration by its Order
entered November 27, 2018.41 The 42 days specified under IAR 14(a) terminated on January
8, 2019. Because Tacke filed his Notice of Appeal on May 6, 201942, his Appeal is untimely as
to all issues, excepting only the District Court's award of the Trust's attorney's fees and costs
in the Amended Judgment entered January 24, 2019.
Whether the Notice of Appeal was timely filed depends on whether the Amended
Judgment, entered January 24, 2019, created a new timeline under IAR 14(a). This Court has
held as follows:
We have held that an amended judgment that does not alter the material
terms from which a party might have appealed does not enlarge the time for
filing an appeal. Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 880, 292 P.3d 264, 271
(2012). Similarly, the entry of the final amended judgments and second
amended judgments in this case did not extend the time for filing a motion
for reconsideration. The final amended judgments did not alter the material
terms of the respective amended judgments, and the addition of the Rule
54(b) certificates in the final amended judgments were already final. The
second amended judgments only increased the amounts of the costs and
attorney fees awarded, they did not alter the prior judgments dismissing
[the] claims. 'An attorney fee award made subsequent to entry of judgment
in a case does not affect the finality of the original judgment.' Tanner v.
Cobb's Estate, 101 Idaho 444,446,614 P.2d 984,986 (1980).
Taylor v. Riley, 162 Idaho 692, 703, 403 P.3d 636 (2017). In his Brief, Tacke argues that the

inclusion of prejudgment interest in the Amended Judgment was a substantive alteration
justifying the commencement of a new timeframe in which to file a Motion for

41

42

R. at pp. 215-18.
R. at pp. 358-63.

13

Reconsideration.43 The Trust anticipates that Tacke will make the same argument regarding
the timeframe in which to file the Appeal.
The Amended Judgment entered January 24, 2019 did not alter the material terms
of the original Judgment entered August 21, 2018 and should be viewed as a non-substantive
motion under Rule 60(a) or 60(b)(l) to incorporate pre-judgment interest which was
previously awarded by the District Court on May 16, 2018.44 On May 16, 2018, the District
Court found that "Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in the loan amount of $500,000,
with interest accrued at the rate of 5%."45 By not including a prejudgment interest amount
in its August 21, 2018 Judgment the District Court made an omission that the District Court
corrected in the January 24, 2019 Amended Judgment in which it awarded the Trust
$136,027.40 in prejudgment interest.46 Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), motions under
Rule 60 and motions for costs and attorney's fees do not toll the time to file an appeal. This
non-tolling restriction is also found in IRCP 60{c)(2), which states that a Rule 60 Motion "does
not affect the judgment's finality or suspend its operation."
This Court addressed the distinction between substantive changes to judgments
versus non-substantive corrections in Vierstra as follows:
In Silsby v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 95 P.3d 28 (2004), this Court discussed the
distinction between substantive motions and motions to address clerical
matters:
Rule 60(a) applies to those errors in which the " ... type of mistake or
omission [isJ mechanical in nature which is apparent in the record
and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an
43

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-19.

44

R. at pp. 93-96.
R. at pp. 93-96.
46
R. at p. 224. Between March 14, 2013 (date of loan) and August 21, 2018 (date of original Judgment),
there are 1986 days. Interest on $500,000 at 5% for 1986 days totals $136,027.40. ($500,000 x .05 x
(1986/365) = $136,027.40).
45
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attorney. The clerical mistake under Rule 60{a) may be differentiated
from the mistake or inadvertence referred to in Rule 60(b)(1), upon
the ground that the latter applies primarily to errors or omissions
committed by an attorney or by the court which are not apparent on
the record." (citation omitted) Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594,
597, 733 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct.App.1987). "Errors of a more substantial
nature are to be corrected by a motion under Rules 59(e) or 60(b).
Thus a motion under Rule 60{a) can only be used to make the
judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it
say something other than what originally was pronounced." (citation
omitted) Dursteler, 112 Idaho at 597, 733 P.2d at 818.

Id. at 411, 95 P.3d at 29.

This focus on the distinction between substantive objections and those
directed to draftsmanship led the Court of Appeals to quote two federal
courts that made the following observation:
"[S]ubstance controls in determining whether a post-judgment
motion is a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60 motion." Marone, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106, 111, n. 3 (7th Cir.1985), quoting
Banko/California, N.A. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 709 F.2d 1174, 1176
(7th Cir.1983).
Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 115 n. 1, 878 P.2d 813,814 n. 1 (Ct.App.1994).
As this statement is consonant with this Court's characterization of the
distinction between motions made pursuant to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60, we
adopt this view.

Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 879-80, 292 P.3d 264, 270-71 (2012)(emphasis added).

An amendment to a judgment which requires no legal decision or judgment by an attorney
is made under Rule 60(a) or 60(b)(l). Merely calculating previously awarded prejudgment
interest does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney.
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, entered May 16, 2018,
awarded the Trust prejudgment interest at 5% per annum, establishing that an award of
prejudgment interest was apparent in the record. 47 When the District Court entered

47

R. at pp. 93-96.
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Judgment on August 21, 2018, it omitted the previously awarded prejudgment interest.48
The Trust's Motion for Prejudgment Interest was not a request for a substantive
determination regarding whether prejudgment interest should be awarded but was a
request that prejudgment interest previously awarded be quantified and incorporated into
an Amended Judgment based upon a mathematical calculation. The purpose of this nonsubstantive Motion was to make the Judgment "speak the truth" on a substantive issue
which the District Court had already pronounced judgment. The Motion for Prejudgment
Interest is a non-substantive motion under Rule 60{a) or 60(b)(l) because the decision on
that Motion did not involve a legal decision or judgment, but was simply a mathematical
calculation of interest from the date of the loan to the date of the Judgment, based upon
the District Court's Order entered May 16, 2018.
When Minnesota considered a similar issue regarding whether award of
prejudgment interest alters the time in which to appeal a judgment in Geekier v. Samuelson,
438 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. App., 1989), the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated as follows:
The trial court's insertion of costs and disbursements and prejudgment
interest did not affect the finality of the original judgment or extend the time
to appeal. Prejudgment interest is not an independent claim, and all claims
were finally determined in the original judgment. Citations omitted.
438 N.W.2d at 741-42.
Florida addressed an almost identical fact pattern in Leila Corp. of St. Pete v. Ossi,
230 So.3d 488 (Fla.App., 2017) as follows:
On appeal, the Defendants raise seven arguments, five of which (raised in
Issues I, II, Ill, VI, and VII) are directed to findings of fact and conclusions of
law that were included in the September 30, 2014, final judgment after
remand. We conclude, however, that we lack jurisdiction to consider the
48

R. at pp. 154-55.
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Defendants' challenges to any issues addressed in that original final
judgment because their notice of appeal was untimely as to those issues.
Although the Defendants contend that their November 20, 2014, motion to
vacate and for rehearing of the November 7, 2014, amended final judgment
tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal as to matters adjudicated in the
original final judgment, we disagree. The only substantive difference
between the original final judgment and the amended final judgment was
the addition of the awards of prejudgment interest, and, like an award of
attorney's fees, "the issue of prejudgment interest does not alter the
substance of the underlying final judgment."Westgate Miami Beach ltd. v.
Newport Operating Corp., 55 So.3d 567, 575 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that
although prejudgment interest is not incidental to final judgment like
attorneys' fees and costs, they are all matters for judge, rather than finder of
fact, to calculate and award and are all calculated at completion of case).
Thus, where only prejudgment interest is added in an amended judgment,
an appeal from that judgment does not "reach back to the original
judgment" but perfects an appeal only from the award of prejudgment
interest. See Jane/Ii v. Pagano, 492 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
("[W]here only attorney's fees are added in an amended judgment, an appeal
from that judgment does not reach back to the original judgment but only
brings the propriety of the attorney's fees up for review.").
It follows, therefore, that a motion for rehearing of the amended final
judgment does not reach back to matters adjudicated in the original final
judgment. Thus, the matters adjudicated in the original final judgment were
ripe for appeal upon the trial court's November 7, 2014, denial of the
Defendants' motion for rehearing of the original final judgment, see Fla. R.
App. P. 9.020(i)(l), and, as to those matters, the Defendants' July 17, 2015,
notice of appeal was plainly untimely, see Jane/Ii, 492 So.2d at 796-97.
Accordingly, we dismiss the Defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction except
as to Issues IV and V pertaining to the awards of prejudgment interest.
Leila Corp. of St. Pete v. Ossi, 230 So.3d 488, 491-92 (Fla.App., 2017)(emphasis added). The
Westgate case relied upon in Leila Corp. was even clearer:

[W]e find it significant that for all practical reasons, prejudgment interest is
more akin to attorneys' fees and costs than other elements of damages.
Attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest are all matters for the judge
to calculate and award, rather than the finder of fact. Also, prejudgment
interest is calculated after a verdict liquidates the plaintiffs pecuniary losses;
in other words, prejudgment interest cannot be determined until the
conclusion of the case, when a verdict is rendered. Attorneys' fees and costs
are also calculated at the completion of the case. Although prejudgment
interest is not incidental to the final judgment like attorneys' fees and costs,
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the issue of prejudgment interest does not alter the substance of the
underlying final judgment. We conclude that allowing the trial court to treat
prejudgment interest like attorneys' fees and costs will further, rather than
impede, the administration of justice.
Westgate Miami Beach v. Newport Operating Corp., 55 So.3d 567, 575 (Fla., 2010)(emphasis

added). The logic of the Minnesota and Florida holdings should be followed by this Supreme
Court.
The District Court in the present action correctly ruled that the Amended Judgment
"did not alter the material terms of the original judgment...." 49 Because the Amended
Judgment did not alter the material terms from which Tacke might have appealed the August
21, 2018 Judgment, the time to appeal from that Judgment expired on January 8, 2019.Tacke
failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal, and this Court is without jurisdiction to review the
District Court's determinations which became final by virtue of the Judgment entered
August 21, 2018. The only issue which could be considered timely appealed is the March 26,
2019 Order regarding the District Court affirming the award of the Trust's attorney's fees
and costs. The District Court appropriately denied the February 7, 2019 Motion for
Reconsideration, as will be discussed below.
B.

Alternatively. If The Motion For Prejudgment Interest Is A Substantive
Motion Under Rule 59. Then The Amended Judgment Entered January 24.
2019 Was A Final Judgment And The Time For Filing An Appeal Expired 42
Days From The February 12th 2019 Order Denying The Substance Of
Appellant's Motion For Reconsideration, Which Would Be March 26. 2019.

The time for filing an appeal is not extended if the only issues remaining are motions
under Rule 60 or motions regarding attorney's fees and costs. Idaho Appellate Rule 14.

49

R. at p. 355.
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Appellate jurisdiction vests only if a notice of appeal is timely filed under IAR 14. Zieman v.

Creed, 121 Idaho 259, 260, 824 P.2d 190 (1992). In the present action, an Amended
Judgment was entered on January 24, 2019. 50 On February 7, 2019, Tacke filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. 51 By Order entered February 12, 2019, the District Court denied the
substance ofthe February 7, 2019 Motion for Reconsideration and determined thatthe only
issues subject to reconsideration were the District Court's "order of prejudgment interest,
costs and attorney's fees." 52
Assuming that the entry of the Amended Judgment on January 24, 2019 constituted
a substantive change under Rule 59, and assuming that the February 7, 2019 Motion for
Reconsideration was timely and tolled the time for filing an appeal, the time to file an appeal
commenced upon entry of the February 12, 2019 Order which denied all claims aside from
prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees. Tacke would then have until March 26, 2019
to file an appeal, which did not occur. The fact that the Court did not decide the issues of
prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees did not delay the commencement of the
time to file an appeal under IAR 14(a) for all the other issues because the Court did enter a
post judgment order deciding all the other issues.

1.

It Was Improper For The District Court To Reconsider Its Award Of
Prejudgment Interest.

IRCP 11.2(b) specifically prohibits a District Court from reconsidering any order made
pursuant to IRCP 59(e), 60(a) or 60(b). Whether the District Court's determination to include
prejudgment interest in the Amended Judgment is a Rule 59(e), 60(a) or 60(b) modification,

so R. at pp. 224--25.
R. at pp. 226-28.

51
52

R. at p. 296.
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it was improper for Tacke to file his February 7, 2019 Motion for Reconsideration as it relates
to the Trust's Motion for Prejudgment Interest because the District Court had no authority
to reconsider the Motion. This interpretation of JRCP 11.2 is consistent with prior case law:
Considering the plain language of the rule and its structure, there are two
different kinds of orders that may be reviewed. The first sentence permits a
court to reconsider interlocutory orders any time prior to entry of final
judgment and the second sentence bars the court's reconsideration of orders
that are made 1) after entry of final judgment, and 2) pursuant to a party's
Rule 59(e) motion. "This Court has repeatedly held that I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B}
[{now I.R.C.P. ll.2{b)] provides a district court with authority to reconsider
and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not been
entered."
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 106-07, 294 P.3d 1111

(2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted}.
The Motion for Prejudgment Interest was of necessity a motion under Rules 59(e),
60(a) or G0(b) as these are the only provisions under the Rules of Civil Procedure which
would authorize this type of post-Judgment motion. Therefore, the District Court had no
authority under IRCP 11.2(b) to reconsider its prior orders or the Amended Judgment as to
prejudgment interest, leaving only attorney's fees and costs as issues properly before the
District Court following entry of the February 12, 2019 Order. No motion was filed after
February 12, 2019. The time for filing an appeal for all other matters (other than attorney's
fees and costs under Rule 54) would have commenced on February 12, 2019 and terminated
on March 26, 2019. Tacke's Notice of Appeal was filed on May 6, 2019.
Although

the

District

Court

improperly considered

Tacke's

Motion

for

Reconsideration of prejudgment interest, the District Court denied Tacke's request. The
District Court's consideration of the Motion was therefore harmless error. Whether this
Court denies Tacke's appeal of prejudgment interest as either (1) untimely, (2) improper, or
20

(3) without merit, the outcome remains the same. Tacke failed to oppose the Trust's Motion
for Prejudgment Interest, improperly filed a motion for reconsideration and failed to timely
appeal the determination and is therefore not entitled to any relief by this Court.
2.

It Was Proper For The District Court To Deny Tacke's Motion To Reconsider
The Award Of Attorney's fees And Costs To The Trust.

In response to the only issue properly addressed by Tacke's February 7, 2019 Motion
for Reconsideration, the District Court entered an Order regarding attorney's fees and costs
on March 26, 201953 which denied Tacke's request and affirmed the award of attorney's fees
and cost to the Trust. 54 It is likely Tacke has relied on this March 26, 2019 Order in calculating
his time to appeal under IAR 14 on all issues.55 However, in the March 26, 2019 Order the
Court simply reaffirmed the February 12, 2019 Order and the Amended Judgment. With
regards to attorney's fees and costs, the District Court found that "[a]t no time did [Tacke]
file an objection to [The Trust's] motion for costs, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest.
Any objection to costs and fees was therefore waived."56
Awards of costs and attorney fees are governed by I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 54(e). When
attorney's fees are requested by a litigant, the claimed fees must be included in the
memorandum of costs filed with the court. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(S) and 54(e)(S). An opposing party
may object to a request for costs or attorney's fees by filing a motion to disallow them within
fourteen days after the cost memorandum has been served. Id. Rule 54(d)(6) "is designed to
establish a deadline for informing the court of any objection to items claimed in the

53

R. at pp. 354-57.
R. at pp. 354-57.
55
42 days from March 26, 2019 is May 7, 2019; Tacke' s Notice of Appeal was filed May 6, 2019. R. at pp.
358-72.
56
R. at p. 355.
54
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memorandum of oosts" and "enables the trial court expeditiously to rule upon such
objections and bring the case to a conclusion." Operating Eng'rs local Union 370 v. Goodwin
Const. Co. of Blackfoot, 104 Idaho 83, 85, 656 P.2d 144, 146 (Ct. App. 1982). It Is wen settled

that where no objection to a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees is filed, the right to
further contest the award is waived. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocoby, 133 Idaho
593, 599-600, 990 P.2d 1204, 1210-11 (1999); Cannarv. Dake, 103 Idaho 761,761,653 P.2d
1173, 1173 (1982); Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 949, 908 P.2d 1252, 1256 {Ct. App.
1995}.
Pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(5) and (e)(6}, the failure to timely object to oosts and
attorney's fees constitutes a waiver of all objections to an award of costs and attorney's fees.
The District Court held that Tacke failed to properly object to the costs and attorney's fees
and thereby waived any claim of error.57 Tacke's failure to object resulted in a waiver of his
right to contest the District Court's award of attorney's fees and costs against him.
11.

IF THIS COURT REACHES THE MERITS OF TACKE'S APPEAL.
REQUESTED RELIEF.

rr SHOULD DENY ANY

As argued above, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider any Issue presented
on appeal, with the sole exception of the District court's determination to award the Trust
its attorney's fees and oosts. In the eventthis court determines that other appeal issues are
properly before the Court, the Trust hereafter responds to the other issues presented on
appeal. However, if this Court determines that the District Court acted Improperly, the
proper course regarding the remaining matters is to have such remanded to the District
Court to provide the Trust an opportunity to conduct discovery and create a record regarding

$7

R. at p. 355.
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any issue which the Trust did not have an opportunity to litigate to the District Court.
A.

The District Court Acted Appropriately When It Permitted The Trust To Recover
Monetary Damages And Did Not Require Specific Performance OfThe Agreement.

In spite of Tacke's complete failure to comply with the terms of the Agreement,
including repayment of the loan or transfer of ownership interests in IMS, Tacke now
demands that the Agreement be specifically enforced by compelling the Trust to accept a
specific performance remedy. Even assuming the Agreement required the Trust to convert
its loan into an equitable interest in IMS, the undisputed fact remains that the loan was not
paid, the equity in IMS was not transferred, and IMS is uncapitalized.58 Further, IMS is no
longer an existing entity, and it would be inequitable and impossible for Tacke to provide
interest in a company which no longer exists, making specific performance impossible. Tacke
breached his Agreement and the Trust has chosen monetary damages in lieu of specific
performance. In his Appellant's Brief, Tacke asserts that "the remedy for missing that
payment was for the Trust to receive equity in IMS."59 This Court has held that "[s]pecific
performance is an extraordinary remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are
inadequate."Pov v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 236, 159 P.3d 870 (2007);

citing Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,823, 136 P.3d 291,294 {2006); see also Paloukos
v. lntermountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978).
In Paloukos, this Court relied upon Idaho's UCC to hold that "specific
performance ...remains an extraordinary remedy generally available only where other
remedies are in some way inadequate."Paloukos1 99 Idaho at 745; citing J. White & R.

58

Tacke has admitted that he did not transfer any land or assets into IMS. See Appellant's Brief, p. 6.
Compelling the Trust to now accept an equity interest in an empty shell would be grossly inequitable.
59
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21.
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Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 6-6 (1972); Sims v.
Purcell, 74 Idaho 109, 257 P.2d 242 {1953); Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 P. 679

(1927). In Paloukos, the Court found that Paloukos alleged no facts suggesting anything
unique about the vehicle, made no argument that damages based on market value was
inadequate, or even argue that the remaining defendant possessed the specific vehicle. Id.
Similarly, Tacke has made no argument to suggest the uniqueness of the gold, silver or
Australian Dollars, did not argue that damages were inadequate, or even assert that he
possessed the necessary items to complete specific performance, in the form of IMS
ownership units. Rather, Tacke attempts to shift the burden to the Trust to establish that a
legal remedy is adequate. This flies in the face of the above cited case law holding that
specific performance to be an extraordinary remedy. Unless equity requires specific
performance, legal remedies should be presumed adequate. Because the Trust has an
adequate remedy at law, specific performance should not be required.
B.

The Agreement Is Not Ambiguous.

Tacke's claim that the Agreement is ambiguous was asserted for the first time in a
single paragraph in Tacke's untimely February 7, 2019 Motion for Reconsideration. 60 Such
claim was not asserted in Tacke's Answer, Counterclaim or in any timely filed motion. Tacke
never moved to amend his pleadings to plead ambiguity. The District Court stated in its
Order, entered November 21, 2018, that the Agreement was not ambiguous. 61 The
November 21, 2018 Order was not identified as a post-Judgment Order being appealed.62

60

R. at p. 236.
R. at p. 217.
62
R. at p. 359.
61
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Under Idaho case law, it was improper for Tacke to assert a new claim or defense in
a Motion for Reconsideration:
The plain language of the rules governing motions to reconsider indicates
that novel claims are not allowed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11
contemplates motions to reconsider, and it provides in pertinent part:
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial
court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment
but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final
judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial
court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there
shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court
entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a},
59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60{b).
The rule plainly allows reconsideration of an interlocutory order. It plainly
does not consider deciding an entirely new claim not previously raised.
Allowing [a party] to add a new claim of which [the opposing party] was not
on notice after the trial already occurred would be greatly prejudicial to [the
opposing party] who did not have a chance to prepare to defend such a
claim. It was therefore not clearly erroneous for the district court to deny [a
party's] motion to reconsider which added new causes of action.

Pandrea v. Barrett, 369 P.3d 943, 951-52 (2016) (emphasis added). Tacke's attempt to assert
new causes of action or new defenses through a Motion for Reconsideration was
appropriately rejected by the District Court and should not be considered by this Court.
Should the Court chose to consider the merits of this argument, the Court should still
affirm the District Court's decision that the Agreement was unambiguous.63 "A contract is
ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Murr v. Selag

Corporation, 113 Idaho 773, 781, 747 P.2d 1302, 1310 (Ct.App.1987); citing Rutter v.
Mclaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). A review of the Agreement

63

R. at p. 217.
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clearly shows that the $500,000 was to be treated as a loan and that any equity transferred
would not satisfy the principal:
The Trust will lend U.S. $500,000.00 to IMS for two years, at 5% interest (the
"Loan"). IMS will repay the Loan in a combination of gold, silver and
Australian Dollars ("AUD"), one third each.

***
If IMS does not repay the Loan no later than March 15, 2015, then the loan
will remain standing as a debt, and IMS will transfer to the Trust 20%
ownership in IMS on March 15, 2015 and 20% ownership on March 15,
2017.64
The Agreement unequivocally and repeatedly refers to the $500,000 as a loan. The
Agreement also clearly states that in the event repayment is not made by March 15, 2015,
the loan would remain as a debt and IMS would transfer a 20% ownership on March 15,
2015 and again on March 15, 2017. The Agreement is not a convertible debenture. The Trust
could have sought specific performance requiring both repayment of the loan and transfer
of the equity interests. Instead, the Trust pursued damages as a legal remedy. No reasonable
reading of the Agreement could be had which concludes that the loan would be satisfied by
the transfer of an equitable interest in IMS. As was recognized by the District Court, parol
evidence cannot be used to modify an unambiguous agreement.65

C.

Mutual Mistake Was Not Properly Presented To The District Court And Was
Not Pied With Specificity As Required By IRCP 9(8}.

The claim that a mutual mistake existed in the Agreement was first asserted by Tacke
in his untimely February 7, 2019 Motion for Reconsideration. 66 Mutual mistake was not

64

R. at p. 38 (emphasis added).
R. at pp. 216-17.
66
R. 226-28

65
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asserted In Tacke's Answer, Counterclaim or in any timely filed motion. Pursuant to IRCP
9(b), a claim for mistake must be pied with particularity. Tacke never pied mistake and never
requested an amendment to include the claim of mutual mistake. This Court should not
consider a claim that was never properly asserted or pied.
As with the claim for ambiguity, It was improper for Tacke to assert mutual mistake
as a new claims/defenses in a Motion for Reconsideratlon.67 Motions for Reconsideration
do not allow a party to argue entirely new claims not previously asserted. Tacke's attempt
to assert new causes of action or new defenses through a Motion for Reconsideration was
appropriately rejected by the District Court.
D.

The Trust Provided The Necessary Proof Of Damages.

The claim that the Trust failed to prove damages was also asserted for the first time
in Tacke's untimely February 7, 2019 Motion for Reconsideration. When presented with the
opportunities to contest damages, Tacke failed to make any objection to the Trust's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment. Tacke did not oppose the Motion and made no efforts to
dispute the damages awarded by the District Court. The District Court appropriately denied
Tacke's attempt to present new claims/defenses In his untimely Motion for Reconsideration.
This Court should reject any attempt by Tacke to now contest the amount of damages
awarded below.
In seeking to overturn the Amended Judgment based on allegations that the Trust
had not proven the value of the "commodity basket," Tacke is still confusing a damages
remedy with specific performance. As noted in Section ll(a), supra, specific performance is

61

Please see arguments regarding new daims/defense in Subsection ll(b), supro.
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an extraordinary remedy which is only utilized when legal remedies are inadequate. The
Trust pursued and was awarded monetary damages, and was not required to prove the
value of a specific performance remedy, which the Trust did not seek.
The proof of valuation of damages is self-evident from the Agreement. A loan of
$500,000 was made on March 14, 2013, which was to accrue interest at 5% per annum.
Tacke failed to repay the loan, the interest, and did not transfer the IMS ownership interest
when he failed to make timely repayment. The appropriate legal remedy is to award
$500,000, plus interest at 5% from the date of the loan, precisely what the District Court did
in the present action. Any attempt to tie repayment to gold, silver and Australian Dollars
would constitute specific performance, which is not necessary when a legal remedy is
adequate and specific performance was not requested.
Should the Court determine that the Trust should have presented the valuation of
the commodity basket, this matter should be remanded to the District Court for evidentiary
analysis.

E.

This Court Should Not Be Swayed By Tacke's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance
Of Counsel.

Throughout Tacke's Appeal Brief, he blames his failure to oppose the Trust's Motions
on previous counsel. This Court should not give any deference to Tacke based upon the
actions, or lack of actions, of his previous counsel. This issue was addressed in Esser Elec. v.

lost River Ballistics Tech., 145 Idaho 912, 188 P.3d 854 (2008), as follows:
Esser Electric's attorney Lary Sisson did not present any sworn statements in
opposition to Lost River's motion for summary judgment. As a result, the
district court granted partial summary judgment holding that Esser Electric
was not entitled to recover on its complaint and that Lost River was entitled
to recover damages on its counterclaims. On appeal, Esser Electric contends
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that the district court should have refused to grant summary judgment
because of the gross misfeasance of its counsel. It points out that defendants
in criminal cases have the right to effective assistance of counsel. It argues
that we should create a similar right in civil cases where counsel's errors have
deprived a party of the right to a fair trial on all or some of the issues in the
case.
In 1906 this Court addressed the issue of whether parties against whom a
judgment had been entered could obtain equitable relief on the ground that
they had been unable to present a full and complete defense due to the
negligence and unskillfulness of their counsel. We held that they could not.
In so holding, we quoted with approval from 1 Black on Judgments, section
375, as follows: "It is well settled that equity will not relieve against a
judgment at law on account of any ignorance, unskillfulness, or mistake of
the party's attorney (unless caused by the opposite party) nor for counsel's
negligence or inattention. The fault in such cases is attributed to the party
himself." Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600,606, 88 P. 82, 83 (1906).
Most recently, in Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818 (2007),
a party to the litigation argued that she should be relieved from a mediation
agreement because she would not have entered into the agreement but for
her attorney's failure to properly advise her on the applicable law. Citing the
Donovan v. Miller case, we rejected her argument, stating, "She voluntarily
chose her attorney and cannot avoid the consequences of any failure on his
part to advise her of the applicable law." 143 Idaho at 627, 151 P.3d at 823.
For over 100 years this Court has held that a party is not entitled to relief
from a judgment on the ground that the judgment was entered due to the
negligence or unskillfulness of the party's attorney. Esser Electric has not
convinced us that we should change that policy. Therefore, it is not entitled
to a new trial on the ground that its counsel committed misfeasance in failing
to respond adequately to the motion for summary judgment.
145 Idaho at 916-17.
This Court should not overturn over 100 years of holdings that civil litigants are not
entitled to relief from a judgment on the ground that their attorney was negligent or
unskillful. This Court should not give deference to Tacke based upon his assertions regarding
the actions of prior counsel.
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Ill.

ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.

A.

Tacke Is Not Entitled To Attomey' s Fees On Appeal.

Tacke is not the prevailing party in this action, and is therefore not entitled to
attorney's fees under IRCP 54{d)(1)(B). Further, this Court should recognize that at no point
has Tacke argued that he has not breached the Agreement, Tacke does not dispute the
existence of the Agreement. Tacke does not dispute that he received the benefit of the
Agreement. Tacke does not dispute that he failed to comply with the terms of the agreement
by repaying the loan and/or providing equity in IMS. Tacke's sole dispute is how damages
are to be calculated. Tacke received the benefit of the Agreement and has failed to make
any attempt to satisfy his obligations. Because Tacke's appeal should fail, this Court should
deny any claim for attorney's fees and costs.
8.

The Trust Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.

The Trust is entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and
Idaho Code Section 12·120(3) and 12·121. Idaho Code Section 12·120(3) allows attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. A
commercial transaction Is any transaction other than one for personal or household
purposes. See Idaho Code Section 12·120{3}. Tacke has acknowledged that the gravamen of
this case is a commercial transaction "because it involves an agreement to invest in or loan
money to someone developing a commercial bottling operation."68 The Trust alleged in its
Amended Complaint that it was entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-

"Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-2S.
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120(3).69 Moreover, the District Court awarded the Trust attorney's fees under 12-120(3).70
Accordingly, as the prevailing party on appeal, the Trust is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees.
Idaho Code Section 12-121 also permits the award of reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party in any civil action when the Court finds the case was brought, pursued
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. By filing a Notice of Appeal
after the time for filing had already terminated, Tacke brought and pursued this appeal
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation as to all substantive issues. Under Idaho
Code Section 12-121, the Trust is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred
in defending against an untimely appeal.
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 40, costs are a matter of course to the prevailing party,
unless otherwise provided by law or court order. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-107,
The Trust is entitled to an award of its costs on appeal as the prevailing party.
CONCLUSION
Whether this Court determines that a Motion for Prejudgment Interest is a
substantive motion under Rule 59{e) or a non-substantive motion under Rule 60, this
Court should find that Tacke failed to timely file his Notice of Appeal under Idaho
Appellate Rule 14, and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider any matter not timely
appealed. The only matter timely appealed was the award of attorney's fees and costs.
This Court should affirm the District Court's holding that Tacke waived his objection to an
award of attorney's fees and costs.

69

R. at p. 33.

70

R. at p. 222.
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If the Court considers the substance of Tacke's appeal, his appeal should be
denied. There is no basis for the Court to award specific performance in this matter, the
Agreement was unambiguous, claims of mutual mistake and ambiguity were not properly
before the District Court, the Trust proved up its damages, and the actions of prior counsel
cannot mitigate an award against Tacke. This Court should further award the Trust its

attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

,,

,{j-

G!_

day of December, 2019.

Bryan D. S i
Smith, Oris I & Associates, PLLC
Attorney for The Christopher W. James Trust, UDT,
February 7, 1979

32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and corre~
BRIEF bye-service to the attorneys listed below on this

RESPONDENT'S REPLY

l;_day of December, 2019:

Steve Wieland
MOONEY WIELAND, PLLC
082 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83702
steven.wieland@mooneywieland.com

L & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

33

APPENDIX A

1112212019

Nevada eSOS

ENTITY INFORMATION

ENTITY INFORMATION

Entity Name:
IDAHO MINERAL SPRINGS, LLC

Entity Number:
E0503242011-3

Entity Type:
Domestic Limited-Liability Company (86)

Entity Status:
Revoked

Formation Date:
09/09/2011

NV Business ID:
NV20111583532

Termination Date:
Perpetual

Annual Report Due Date:
9/30/2013

Serles LLC:

https1Iesos.nv.gov1EnfitySearcMluslnesslnformaoon

113

34

Nevada asos

11122121)19

Restricted LLC:

REGISTERED AGENT INFORMATION

Name of Individual or Legal Entity:
NEVADA CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS, INC

Status:
Active

CRA Agent Entity Type:
Registered Agent Type:
Commercial Registered Agent

NV Business ID:
NV20191484737

Office or Position:

Jurisdiction:
NEVADA

Street Address:
4730 S. FORT APACHE RD SUITE 300, Las Vegas, NV, 89147 - 7947 USA

Email Address:
RENEWALS@NCHINC.COM

Mailing Address:

hllps:H'esos.nv.gov,EntitySearchl'Businesslnfonnation
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Individual with Authority to A.ct:
Contact Phone Number:

Fictitious Website or Domain Name:

PRINCIPAL OFFICE ADDRESS

Address:
Mailing Address:

OFFICER INFORMATION

0 VIEW HISTORICAL DATA
L,m

Title

Name

Manager BOB
TACKE

Address

Updated

Sra.tus

PO BOX 27740, LAS VEGAS, NV, 89126,
USA

10/01/2012

ACllVe

Po_g• 1 cif 1, r.cord~ 1 to I ol 1

Filing History

Name History

Return to Search

Mergers/Conversions

Return to Results
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